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Understanding the Determinants of Crime 
by Ayse İmrohoroğlu, Antonio Merlo, and Peter Rupert 
 
 
In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model in which individuals are allowed 
to engage in both legitimate market activities and criminal behavior in order to assess the 
role of certain factors on the property crime rate. In particular, we investigate whether the 
following could be capable of generating large differences in crime rates that are 
observed across countries: differences in the unemployment rate, the fraction of low-
human-capital individuals in an economy, the probability of apprehension, the duration of 
jail sentences, and income inequality. We find that small differences in the probability of 
apprehension and in income inequality can generate quantitatively significant differences 
in the crime rates across similar environments. 
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The roots of economic models of crime can be traced back to the seminal works of Becker (1968) and Stigler 
(1970).
4 Becker (1968) starts with a question: What is the optimal level of enforcement in a society? The answer 
is shown to depend on the cost of convicting offenders and the responses of offenders to changes in enforcement. 
The response of offenders to changes in enforcement underscores the importance of economic modeling. The 
novelty of this approach is in its focus on economic reasons for criminal behavior as opposed to relying on 
personality traits that are special to criminals. Focusing on individual responses to the incentives in an economy 
can provide important insights into the effectiveness of different law enforcement policies as well as identifying 
the role of changes in the economic well being of individuals that can affect their choices in terms of legitimate 
versus illegitimate activities. 
 
In his survey, Ehrlich (1996) focuses on two aspects of economic models of crime. First is the 
application of economic incentives in trying to understand all crimes -ranging from theft to murder- as opposed 
to social or environmental factors that are beyond an individual’s choice. Second, is optimal crime prevention: 
the optimal mix of negative versus positive incentives that can be used to deter individuals from criminal 
activities. He indicates that the relative desirability of different methods of crime control depend not only on the 
relative efficiency of certain factors but also on the welfare objective being used. 
 
Although most models of crime offer explanations for a particular country or region, economic models 
of crime can be used to understand if differences in factors related to economic conditions or the effectiveness of 
law enforcement across countries could be responsible for the large variations in their crime rates. According to 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, people victimized by property crime (as a % 
of the total population) varied between 14.8% in New Zealand to 12.7% in Italy, 12.2% in U.K., 10.0% in U.S., 
and 3.4% in Japan.
5 According to the same data source, out of 100 countries, Spain has the highest per capita 
robberies (12.36 per 1000 people) followed by U.K. ranking 8th highest, U.S. 11th, Russia 19th, Italy 25th and 
Turkey 60th. Figure 1 displays the victimization rates across several countries in 1999 for burglary. 
 
                                                 
4 See also Ehrlich (1973), and Polinsky and Shavell (1984). Ehrlich (1996) provides a survey of recent 
contributions. In addition, special issue of the International Economic Review (2004) provides many recent 
papers using economic modeling for examining criminal behavior. 
5 Property crime includes car theft, theft from car, burglary with entry and attempted burglary. It is important to 
note that these crime statistics are often better indicators of prevalence of law enforcement and willingness to 
report crime, than actual prevalence. For most countries the reported crime rates are for 1999. 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/cri_pro_cri_vic/EUR 
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Countries also differ substantially in many dimensions that may matter for issues related to crime. For 
example, the number of police, the probability of apprehension, the probability of being sentenced, the duration 
of the jail sentence, as well as economic conditions such as the unemployment rate, age distribution of the 
population etc. vary significantly across countries. Figure 2 displays data on the number of police officers and 
the duration of sentencing for robberies in a selection of countries obtained from Barclay and Tavares (2003). In 
the first panel, the number of police officers per 100,000 persons averaged over 1999 and 2001 are presented. 
According to this data, the number of police officers per 100,000 persons varies between 623 for Cyprus and 605 
for Northern Ireland to 156 in Finland. Perhaps partly due to these differences, the fraction of crimes cleared by 
an arrest also varies substantially across countries. The second panel of the graph presents data on the percent of 
sentences greater than 24 months and less than 60 months. Again we observe large differences across countries. 
For example, while 50% of sentences in England and Wales require sentencing that is more than 2 years, the 
same is true only for 6 percent of sentences in France. 
 
Admittedly there are major difficulties in relying on cross country data for a careful study. However, 
these data convincingly demonstrate that large differences do exist across countries in the design and conduct of 
law enforcement. 
  3 
 
While it is very desirable to understand the differences in crime rates across countries, there are many 
obstacles to cross-national studies in this field. In particular, traditional data sources such as police statistics or 
national victimization surveys are quite difficult to use for examining crime rates across countries.
6 In this paper, 
                                                 
6 There are large differences across countries in the way crime data are defined and collected. There are also 
major differences in reporting practices across countries. In addition, nationally designed surveys show 
important differences in research design, the questionnaires, and the kind of crimes respondents are asked about. 
One data source, International Crime Victims Survey presents data for a large group of countries where the same 
  4we use the model economy in İmrohoroğlu, Merlo and Rupert (2004) that allows us to quantitatively assess the 
role of some of the factors discussed above in affecting the property crime rate. We follow the tradition of using 
economic modeling to examine issues related to property crimes which are typically motivated by the prospect 
of direct pecuniary gain. Economic considerations are therefore most likely to guide individual decisions of 
engaging in this type of criminal activities. To achieve our goal we specify a dynamic overlapping generations 
(OLG) model with heterogeneous agents. We examine individuals who start their economically meaningful lives 
at the age of 15 and live until the retirement age of 65.
7 The agents in our model differ ex ante with respect to 
their income earning abilities. We consider four categories of skill type; less than high school, high school 
degree but no higher degree, college degree, and more than a college degree. In each period of their (finite) life 
agents receive a stochastic employment opportunity. After knowing their employment status, they decide how 
much to save and whether to engage in criminal activities in that period. Criminal activities amount to stealing 
from other agents in the economy. If agents choose to commit a crime, they may be apprehended and punished. 
If they are apprehended, they spend a period (specified by the duration of an average jail sentence) in prison and 
are not able to claim any legitimate earnings from the market. We calibrate this model economy to the crime rate 
in the U.S. in 1980. Later we conduct counterfactual experiments to investigate the differences in the crime rate 
that would take place due to differences in factors such as: apprehension probability, expected prison time, 
income inequality, and skill distribution of the population. We carry out these experiments by increasing each 
one of these factors by 10% instead of trying to calibrate them to a particular country. We compare steady state 
crime rates that result from change in each one of these factors. 
 
While we calibrate the model economy to match the crime rate in the U.S. in 1980 only, our results 
indicate that this framework is capable of reproducing certain dimensions of the socio-demographic composition 
of the criminal population in the U.S. fairly well. For example, our model predicts that approximately 5% of the 
employed and 16% of the unemployed population engages in criminal activities. In addition, the model-predicted 
fraction of criminals without a high school diploma is equal to 46.1%. These implications of the model are 
consistent with the data. Given these properties of the model, we focus our attention on examining the sensitivity 
of the property crime rate to several economic factors and law enforcement tools. We find that two factors 
generate quantitatively significant increases in the crime rate relative to the rest of the factors. Those are the 
apprehension probability and income inequality. Thus we conclude that small differences in apprehension 
probabilities or income inequality would be capable of generating large differences in property crime rates across 
countries. These results complement an extensive amount of research pointing to the importance of income 
inequality and deterrence effects of the justice system in understanding criminal behavior.
8
 
In section 2 we describe the model economy and discuss its calibration. Section 3 presents the results 





The model economy which is populated by overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents is taken from 
İmrohoroğlu, Merlo and Rupert (2004). 
 
Preferences 
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals who are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their 
income earning abilities. Each individual maximizes the expected, discounted lifetime utility 












                                                                                                                                                         
methods and questionnaires are used to generate crime statistics. However, the scope of data in this source is not 
very large. 
7 Since the majority of property crimes are committed by young individuals, we abstract from the behavior of 
agents above 65 year old and issues related to social security 
8 For the impact of income inequality, see for example, Dahlberg and Gustavsson (2005), Nilsson (2004), 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002), and Freeman (1996). There is also a well-developed literature on 
deterrence and incapacitation effects of the criminal justice system. See, for example, Ehrlich (1973, 1981), 
Blumstein, Nagin, and Cohen (1978), Cameron (1988), DiIulio and Piehl (1991), Grogger (1991), Levitt (1998), 
and Marvell and Moody (1996). 
  5where β  is the subjective discount factor, and 
i
j c  is consumption of a type-i  individual of age  j . The share of 
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= = ∑  whereI is the number of skill types. 
 
Opportunities 
In each period of their life, individuals face a stochastic employment opportunity. Let  { } , sS e u ∈= denote the 
employment opportunities state. If s , the agent is unemployed. If u = se = , the agent is given the opportunity 
to work and will supply labor inelastically. In addition, regardless of their employment status, agents can choose 
to engage in criminal activities. For a type-  individual of age i j , we let  { } 0,1
i
j ∈ A denote the individual’s 
choice to engage in criminal activities or not. In particular,  1
i
j = A  indicates an individual who commits a crime 




The labor income of an agent who is given an opportunity to work is denoted by 
i
j whε  where   
denotes the wage rate, h  denotes the number of hours spent working, and 
w
i
j ε  denotes the efficiency index of a 
type-i agent of age  j . Unemployed individuals receive unemployment insurance benefits equal to a fraction θ  
of the employed wage,
i
j wh θ ε . The only role of government in this economy is to administer the unemployment 
insurance program by choosing the tax rate τ  so that its budget is balanced.
9 Hence, the disposable income from 
legitimate activities of a type-   individual of age  i j  is given by 
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We assume that the employment opportunities state follows a Markov process with transition 
probabilities matrices  , where    (, ) , , , jj lk lk eu π ⎡⎤ Π= = ⎣⎦ () 1 (, ) P r , jj j lk s k s l π + == | =
1,..., 1 j J =− . We allow for the unemployment rate to vary with age.
10
 
In this economy, criminal activities amount to theft. Each individual faces an equal probability  v π of 
being the victim of a crime, where  v π  is equal to the (endogenous) fraction of criminals in the population. If 
victimized, an individual loses a fraction α  of his disposable income from legitimate activities. For 
computational simplicity, we assume that each criminal steals a fraction α  of average disposable income from 
legitimate activities, y , that is criminals do not have the ability to target their victims based on their income.
11 
Criminals face a probability  a π of being apprehended. A criminal who is apprehended for a crime goes to jail. 
 
Given these assumptions, the budget constraint facing an individual who chooses not to be a criminal 
can be written as 
                                                 
9 The government may also use tax revenue to finance a technology used to apprehend or deter criminals. In this 
paper we abstract from this using an exogenous probability of apprehension. For a model where expenditures on 
police are determined endogenously see İmrohoroğlu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000). 
10 This framework abstracts from possible interactions between current criminal activities and future 
employment opportunities. For an extension of this model that includes the ‘stigma” effect of incarcerations, see  
İmrohoroğlu, Merlo and Rupert (2004). 
11 We also do not allow for private insurance. See Prohaska and Taylor (1973) for a model of insurance coverage 
against burglary.  
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j a  is the end-of-period asset holdings of a type-i agent of age  j ,   is the rate of return on asset 
holdings, and T  denotes a lump-sum transfer. Similarly, the budget constraint facing an individual who chooses 
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where c  is the level of consumption of a convicted criminal. Note that we assume that apprehended criminals 
cannot access their assets to finance their consumption while they are in jail. 
 
Agents in this economy are not allowed to borrow and have no access to private insurance markets. 
They are able to accumulate assets to help smooth consumption across time. This liquidity constraint can be 
stated as 
 




An implication of this assumption, together with the lack of a bequest motive indicates that in period   all 




J a =   1,...., . iI =  
 
Technology 
The production technology of the economy is given by a constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas function 
 
 
1 (,) , Qf K N B KN
η η − =≡  (6) 
 
where   is the labor share of output, and   and   are aggregate capital and labor inputs, 
respectively. The aggregate capital stock is assumed to depreciate at the rate 
( 0, 0,1 B η >∈ ) K N
δ . 
 
The profit-maximizing behavior of the firm gives rise to first-order conditions which determine the net 
real return to capital 
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The concept of equilibrium we use in this article follows Stokey and Lucas (1989) where we can 
represent the consumer’s utility maximization problem as a finite-state, finite horizon discounted dynamic 
program for which an optimal stationary Markov plan always exists. Let   be the (maximized) value of  (,)
i
c Va s
  7the objective function of a type-  agent of age  i j  with beginning-of-period asset holdings and employment 




The dynamic programming problem faced by an individual of a given skill-type i who may or may not 
have received an employment opportunity can be written as: 
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subject to the budget constraints in equations (3) and (4), where 
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is the value of not committing a crime in the current period, and 
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is the value of committing a crime in the current period, where  1,..., iI = , and 
i y is equal 
to () 1
i wh τ ε −  for   and  se =
i wh θ ε  for su = . 
 
Definition: A Stationary Equilibrium for a given set of policy arrangements { } , τ θ  and an apprehension 
probability  a π  is a collection of value functions  , individual policy rules  (,)
i
j Va s ,,
ii
j j c A  age and type 
dependent, time-invariant measures of agents   for each age  (,)
i
j as λ 1,..., j J = and each type  , an 
aggregate crime rate and victimization probability 
1,..., iI =
{ } , v χ π , relative prices of labor and capital { } , wr , an 
average disposable income from legitimate activities  y , and a lump-sum transfer T  such that: 
 
i)  Individual and aggregate behavior are consistent. 
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iv)  Relative prices { } , wr solve the firm's profit maximization problem by satisfying equations (7) and (8); 
 
  8v)  Given relative prices { } , wr , government policy { } , τ θ , probabilities { } , av π π , average income  y , and 
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vi)  The commodity market clears, 
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where the initial wealth distribution of agents,  ,  0
i a 1,..., i =  is taken as given; 
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aj aa aa s ′ Ω≡ = , and the initial measures of agents at birth,  0
i λ ,  , are taken as 
given; 
1,..., i = I
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ix)  The income of individuals who are convicted of a crime is confiscated and used to finance the consumption 
expenditures of convicted criminals c. Any income in excess of these expenditures is distributed in a lump-
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Parameter Choice and Data 
As mentioned above, the proposed exercise necessitates a benchmark calibration for the model economy. We 
choose 1980 in the U.S. as a benchmark and conduct exercises to examine the quantitative role of several factors 
on the crime rate. 
 
The utility function   is set to be logarithmic. A period in the model is one year. An overlapping 
generations structure is imposed where individuals are assumed to be born at the real-time age of 15 and live 
 years, to the real-time age of 65. The model economy’s inhabitants are distinct with respect to their age 
and their human capital type. Specifically, we consider 
() . U
51 J =
4 I =  skill levels corresponding to the following 
categories: less than high school, high school degree but no higher degree, college degree, and more than a 
college degree. 
 
If an individual is employed, he spends a fraction  0.45 h =  of his time working. In the event that an 
individual becomes unemployed he receives unemployment insurance with a replacement rate θ  equal to 0.83.
12
                                                 
12 Unemployment duration in the model is one year (one period) while in the U.S. the replacement ratio is 0.25 
and duration is about 12 weeks, which means individuals would receive 83% of their income if they were to be 
unemployed 12 weeks and employed the rest of the year. 
  9 
The parameter α  that characterizes criminal earnings from property crimes as well as the costs of 
property crime to victims is set to be 0.15 (see İmrohoroğlu, Merlo and Rupert (2000)). While in prison the 
apprehended criminal receives a per-period consumption level denoted by c . Given that there is little data on 
consumption and utility while in prison, c  is treated as a free parameter and is used to calibrate the model to 
match the crime rate in the U.S in 1980. The calibrated value of c  is equal to 0.052, which corresponds to about 
$1,400 (in 1990 dollars).
13
 
With respect to the production side of the economy, the following parameter values were chosen: B  
=1.295,  0.64, and  0.08 η δ == . This parameterization is fairly standard and together with setting the 
discount factor β  equal to 0.989 produces an economy where the capital output ratio is around 2.5. For a 
discussion of issues related to calibrating these parameters see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott (1995) or İmrohoroğlu, 
İmrohoroğlu and Joines (1999). 
 
The share of age- j  individuals in the population, j μ , for 1980 is taken from the Bureau of the Census. 
The share of type-  individuals in the population, i i γ , is taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS), where 
1 γ  denotes the fraction of individuals with less than a high school degree,  2 γ  the fraction of individuals with a 
high school degree but no higher degree,  3 γ  the fraction of individuals with a college degree, and  4 γ  the 
fraction of individuals with more than a college degree. For 1980, these are  1 0.11 γ =  ,  2 γ =0.64, 
34 0.17, 0.08 γ γ == . The age earnings profiles, 
i
j ε , are constructed from the CPS for each year by 
regressing the log of real weekly earnings on age, age-squared, and dummy variables for different human capital 
types (the omitted category being those with less than a high school degree). 
 
                                                 
13 Average consumption in this framework is about 0.8 while average output is normalized to be 1. So 
c corresponds to 6.5% of total consumption. To provide another term of comparison, note that the per inmate 
annual expenditure on food (obtained by dividing total annual expenditures on food by the average daily 
population in federal correctional facilities for 1990) amounts to about $1,600 (U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Office of 
Research and Evaluation, unpublished data, 1990). 
 








2 age   -0.0014 
 (0.00001) 




Post graduate  0.808 
 (0.015) 
 
Age-specific unemployment rates are used to generate the transition probabilities of the employment 
opportunities state, j Π , so that the fraction of the time the employment opportunity is offered equals the 
employment rate of that age group. For example, if the unemployment rate of 16-year old individuals in the data 
is 20.2%, the transition probabilities for this age group are chosen so that the probability of unemployment will 
equal 0.202, independent of the availability of the opportunity the previous period. Thus, the transition 
probabilities matrix for age-16 individuals would be given as 
 









Unemployment rate data indicates an unemployment rate of 6.9% for the 15-65 year age group and 
17.1% for the 15-19 year age group for this time period. The apprehension technology of the police is 
summarized by the clearance rate, which is the fraction of crimes cleared (solved) by arrest. We take that rate to 
be 16.8% in 1980 and the expected prison time to be 12.6 months. 
 





In table 2 we present several properties of the benchmark economy calibrated to deliver a crime rate of 5.6% to 
match the crime rate in the U.S. in 1980. In particular, we investigate the implications of our model with respect 
to the composition of the criminal population. First, note that our model predicts that about 79% of the people 
engaging in criminal activities are employed and only the remaining 21% are unemployed. This implies that 
approximately 5% (16%) of the employed (unemployed) population engages in criminal activities. This (perhaps 
surprising) implication of the model is consistent with the data. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 
1979, 71% of all state prisoners were employed prior to their conviction.
15 Studies by Grogger (1998) and Witte 
and Tauchen (1994) that use other data sets provide further evidence in support of this finding. Next, we turn our 
attention to the composition of the criminal population by age and educational attainment. Our model predicts 
that about 76% of the people who commit property crimes are 18 years of age or younger. According to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 1980, 47.7% of all people arrested for property offenses were 18 years of age 
or younger. While the figure in the data is much lower than the one generated by the model, juvenile property 
offenders are often released without being formally arrested and charged of a crime. Furthermore, the model-
predicted fraction of criminals without a high school diploma is equal to 46.1%. In 1979, 52.7% of the 
                                                 
14 Dependent Variable is log of real weekly earnings with standard errors in parentheses. 
15This statistic is taken from the Profile of State Prison Inmates (NCJ-58257), August 1979. Unfortunately, this 
information is not available for criminals convicted for property offenses only. 
 
  11correctional population in state prisons did not have a high school diploma.
16  Hence, the model seems to be 
capable of reproducing certain dimensions of the socio-demographic composition of the criminal population 
fairly well. In addition, the model matches the capital output ratio and the share of consumption in output for 
1980.  
 
Table 2: Benchmark 
Crime rate  5.6 
Fraction of criminals who are employed  78.8 
Fraction of criminals who are unemployed  21.2 
Fraction of criminals 18 years of age or younger  76.1 
Fraction of criminals with less than a high school degree  46.1 
 
 
In table 3 we present results of three experiments to assess the quantitative impact of several factors. In each 
case, we increase a particular parameter by 10% and examine the resulting change in the crime rate and several 
other statistics. For example, in column 3 we report the results of an experiment where the apprehension 
probability is increased by 10% from 16.80% to 18.50%; in column 4 we examine the case where income 
inequality as measured by the standard deviation of earnings is increased by 10%.
17 In the last column we 
examine what happens to the crime rate if the economy has a higher fraction of low human capital individuals by 
increasing the fraction of low human capital types in the economy by 10% and decreasing the fraction of the 




                                                 
16 This statistic is also taken from the Profile of State Prison Inmates (NCJ-58257), August 1979. 
17There are several different ways to increase income inequality in this model. Instead of carrying out an 
arbitrary experiment, we have used the income data from 1985 in the U.S. which indicates a 10% increase in the 
standard deviation of earnings. This is also a period where the wage gap between individuals with high school 
degrees and those with higher degrees have widened significantly.  
 
  12Table 3: Results 
 Bench 
a π   Ineq. 
1 γ  
Crime  rate  5.6  3.17 8.62 5.25 
% of criminals who are employed  78.8  77.5  79.4  76.9 
% of criminals who are unemployed  21.2  22.5  20.6  23.1 
% of criminals 18 years of age or younger  76.1  70.2  78.5  72.6 
% of criminals with less than a HS  degree  46.1 68.7 35.8 53.2 
 
 
Several interesting points emerge from the results in table 3. For example, if we compare the results in 
the benchmark economy with those in the economy where only the apprehension probability, a π , is increased by 
10%, we observe a 44% decline in the overall crime rate. A 10% increase in income inequality causes a 54% 
increase in the crime rate.  
On the other hand, a 10% increase in the fraction of individuals without a high school degree, γ1, causes 
a small decline in the crime rate, from 5.6% to 5.25%. While young low human capital type individuals 
constitute the largest group engaging in criminal activities in this environment, their overall weight in the 
population is not too large. In addition, in order to keep the population constant this experiment was conducted 
by reducing the share of the high human capital types in the economy by 10%. These changes result in a 5% 
lower overall income, which causes a reduction in the average gains obtained from property theft, and a 1% 
lower standard deviation of income.
18 Overall, the resulting crime rate in this experiment is lower. These results 
indicate that an increase in the fraction of low human capital types in a society, perhaps through migration, may 
not necessarily cause an increase in the crime rate. What may be more important are the implied income 
inequality and the apprehension probability in understanding large differences in property crime rates across 
countries. 
There are significant differences in the schooling characteristics of criminals in these experiments. In 
this model, for most of the parameter choices, only the individuals without a high school degree and with just a 
high school degree engage in property crime. However, the fraction of these groups responsible for property 
crime seems highly sensitive to some of the conditions in the economy. For example, the increase in the 
apprehension probability by 10% seems to deter mostly the individuals with a high school degree from engaging 
in criminal activities, resulting in the fraction of criminals with less than a high school degree to increase to 
68.7% from its benchmark value of 46.1%. On the other hand, the experiment where income inequality is 
increased by 10% results in a higher fraction of crimes committed by those with a high school degree. The main 
reason for this result is the particular way income inequality is increased in this period, the wage gap between 
individuals with a high school degree and those with higher degrees has widened substantially. Consequently, we 
observe a significant increase in the percent of criminals with a high school degree in this experiment. 
Among the variables examined above, apprehension probability may be the one factor that is easiest to 
change by policy makers, perhaps by devoting more resources to enforcement. In this case it would be 
interesting to compare changes in the property crime rate that would occur due to the increase in the 
apprehension probability versus an increase in the duration of jail time. In the benchmark calibration duration of 
incarceration was set to 12 months which was the average duration in the U.S. in 1980. As the second panel of 
Figure 2 shows, incarceration duration varies significantly across countries. To check the sensitivity of the 
property crime rate to the length of a jail sentence we increase the duration by 10% to 13.2 months. 
 
Table 4: Results 
 Bench.  Apprehension  Duration  U-rate 
Crime rate  5.6  3.17  4.73  5.94 
 
Comparing the results in columns three and four to the benchmark in column 2, demonstrate that while 
a 10% increase in the apprehension probability reduces the crime rate by 43.4%, a 10% increase in the duration 
of incarceration decreases the crime rate only by 15.5%. 
 
                                                 
18 There is also a decrease in the opportunity cost of incarceration since c is kept constant. However, this 
decrease is quantitatively very small.  
  13In the last column, we report the crime rate in the case where both the overall unemployment rate and 
the unemployment rate of 15-19 year olds are increased by 10%. Notice that this change causes only a 6% 
increase in the crime rate. It is important to realize that in the benchmark economy 79% of the people engaging 
in criminal activities are employed and only the remaining 21% are unemployed. This implies that 
approximately 5% of the employed and 16% of the unemployed population engages in criminal activities. Given 
this result it is not surprising that a 10% increase in the unemployment rate results in a 6% increase in the 
property crime rate. While this is not an insignificant change in the crime rate, its magnitude is much smaller 
than the changes caused by apprehension probability and income inequality.
19
 
Figure 3 summarizes the crime rates that resulted from our five experiments. 
 
We can also observe from this figure the prominent role played by the apprehension probability and 
income inequality. It is important to point out that the purpose of these counterfactual experiments in not to 
provide insights into how these changes, such as an increase in the apprehension probability or a decrease in the 
income inequality, could be accomplished. Rather, their aim is to provide insight into the quantitative importance 




In this paper, a fully specified overlapping generations framework is used to examine the sensitivity of the 
property crime rate to several economic factors and law enforcement tools that vary significantly across 
countries. In particular, we examine individuals who start their economically meaningful lives at the age of 15 
and live until the retirement age of 65. In each period, agents of four different skill levels receive a stochastic age 
specific employment opportunity. After knowing their employment status, they decide how much to save and 
whether to engage in criminal activities in that period. Criminal activities amount to stealing from other agents in 
the economy. If agents choose to commit a crime, they may be apprehended and punished. If they are 
apprehended, they spend a period in prison and are not able to claim any legitimate earnings from the market. 
This framework allows us to quantitatively examine the effect of several factors on the crime rate such as the 
unemployment rate, fraction of low human capital individuals in an economy, apprehension probability, duration 
of a jail sentence and income inequality. Among the variables we introduce, we identify the apprehension 
probability and differences in income inequality as having a major impact on the crime rate. 
                                                 
19 Since labor supply is inelastic, this framework is not well suited to run an experiment with changes in the 
generosity of unemployment insurance payments See Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (1992) for issues related to 
changes in unemployment insurance. 
 
  14 
Given the large differences in crime rates across countries, it would be desirable to collect precise data 




Barclay, Gordon and Cynthia Tavares. 2000. International comparisons of criminal justice statistics. Home 
  Office Statistical Bulletin, December 2003. 
 
Becker, Gary  S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 78, pp: 
 169-217. 
 
Blumstein, Alfred, Daniel Nagin and Jacqueline Cohen. 1978. Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the 
  Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates. Washington: National Academy of Sciences. 
 
Cameron, Samuel. 1998. “The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence.” Kyklos 41, 
  no. 2, pp: 301.23. 
 
Cooley, Tom F. and Edward C. Prescott. 1995. “Economic Growth and Business Cycles.” In T. F. Cooley, ed., 
  Frontier of Business Cycle Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Dahlberg, Matz and Magnus Gustavsson. 2005. “Inequality and Crime: Separating the Effect from Permanent 
  and Transitory Income.” Working Paper Series 2005:19, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy 
 Evaluation. 
 
DiIulio, John and Anne M. Piehl.1991. “Does Prison Pay? The Stormy National Debate over the Cost-
  Effectiveness of Imprisonment.” Brookings Rev. 9, pp: 28.35. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac. 1973. “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.” 
  Journal of Political Economy 81, 521-565. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac. 1981. “On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, 
 Incapacitation,  and  Deterrence.”  American Economic Review. 71: 307.22. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac. 1996. “Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 
 pp:  43-67. 
 
Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza. 2002. “Inequality and Violent Crime,” Journal of Law 
  & Economics, vol. 45(1), pp: 1-40. 
 
Freeman, Richard B. 1996. “Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do 
 about  It?”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 10(1), pp: 25-42. 
 
Grogger, Jeffrey. 1991. “Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment.” Econ. Inquiry 29, pp: 297. 309. 
 
Grogger, Jeffrey. 1998. “Market Wages and Youth Crime,” Journal of Labor Economics 16, pp: 756-91. 
 
Hansen, Gary and Ayşe  İmrohoroğlu. 1992. “The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with 
  Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard.” Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 100, no.1, pp: 118-142. 
 
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe, Selahattin İmrohoroğlu and Douglas Joines. 1999. “Social Security in an Overlapping 
  Generations Economy with Land.” Review of Economic Dynamics 2 , pp: 638-665. 
 
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe., Antonio Merlo and Peter Rupert. 2004. “What Accounts for the Decline in Crime?” 
  International Economic Review, Volume 45, issue 3, pp: 707-730. 23 
 
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe, Antonio  Merlo and Peter Rupert. 2000. “On the Political Economy of Income 
 Redistribution  and  Crime,”  International Economic Review 41, pp: 1-25. 
 
  15Levitt, Steve. 1998. “Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or 
 Measurement  Error?”  Econ. Inquiry 36: 353.72. 
 
Marvell, Thomas B., and Carlisle E. Moody. 1996. “Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates.” 
 Criminology  34:609.46. 
 
Nilsson, Anna. 2004. "Income inequality and crime: The case of Sweden," Working Paper Series, IFAU - 
  Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. 
 
Polinsky, Mitchell and Steven Shavell. 1984. “The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment”, Journal of Public 
  Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 89-99. 
 
Prohaska, Charles and Walton Taylor.  1973. ``Minimizing Losses in a Hostile Enviroenment: The Cost of 
 Defending  One’s  Castle.”  The Journal of Risk and Insurance . Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 375-387 
 
Stigler, George J. 1970. “The Optimum Enforcement of Laws.” Journal of Political Economy 78, 526-536. 
 
International Economic Review, August 2004. Vol. 45, No. 3. 
 
Witte, Ann D. and Helen Tauchen. 1994. “Work and Crime: An Exploration Using Panel Data.” Public Finance 
  49, pp: 155-167. 
 
  16